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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

COMMITTEES
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY
FOREIGN RELATIONS
SMALL BUSINESS

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October 8, 1981

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY PSchmelz DATE 4/10/87
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The Honorable James L. Buckley
Under Secretary of State for
Security Assistance, Science
and Technology
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Jim:

Our conversation yesterday was extremely beneficial with respect to the resolution I submitted on Monday about the arms sales package to Saudi Arabia. I am looking forward to seeing the draft letter which incorporates the language of my resolution, particularly mentioning Saudi movement in recognizing the right of the existence of the State of Israel.

This action on the part of the President would certainly meet one of my major concerns. However, I thought it would be helpful to you if I sent you a copy of a letter I received from Richard Allen earlier this week.

As you know, Mr. Allen talked with me last month about concerns I had about the arms sales package to the Saudis. You can see from the enclosed letter we discussed a range of issues, including one that I know is of particular concern to you, Mr. Secretary. I feel this arms sales package raises questions about the broader issue of the U.S. arms sales policy world wide. As chairman of the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, I am especially concerned about our hesitancy to sell an advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan. Since my discussion with Mr. Allen, I have become even more distressed over this delay in view of the recent news coming out of the PRC. I addressed this issue when Secretary Haig appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee on September 17. I am enclosing the response I received from the State Department. I find it unsatisfactory.

One of the other issues I discussed with Mr. Allen has an indirect bearing on the AWACS matter, but is important nevertheless. In June I wrote to Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Haig about serious U.S. Air Force operational readiness deficiencies in support of the AWACS aircraft we currently have deployed in Saudi Arabia. The response I received from Secretary Weinberger indicates that the Air Force is pursuing a long-term solution to the deficiencies in the Tactical Air Control System. My correspondence with the State Department has not been as positive. I am hopeful that this problem can be resolved in the very near future.

Finally, I am encouraged by the action that the Departments of State and Defense seem to be taking on the POW/MIA issue. In view of the President's deep personal interest I would be most happy to discuss it with him.

I am enclosing a copy of the statement I made on the Senate Floor on Monday when I submitted my resolution. I hope it clarifies my position.

Sincerely,

Sam

S. I. Hayakawa

SIH/bf

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 1, 1981

Dear Senator Hayakawa:

Thank you for receiving me and my colleagues on September 14. This letter responds to issues you raised at that meeting, and I have held it pending completion of recent deliberations on these subjects.

The Air Force informs me that they replied to your query on the Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC-85) on September 28. Please advise me if you require more information.

On Laos and the POW/MIA issue, the Departments of State and Defense are taking action in response to your very helpful discussions with Laotian officials, and I am told that you and your staff are being kept informed. We appreciate your pathbreaking efforts on this issue, one in which the President has a deep personal interest.

As we discussed, the question of advanced aircraft sales -- including the F-5G -- to Taiwan is both complex and important. We are analyzing this issue in great detail and anticipate a decision by year's end. You will be kept informed of our progress.

The primary purpose of our visit, of course, was to convey to you the President's case on the Saudi air defense package and his personal request for your support of his proposal. Attached is a paper analyzing your June letter to California constituents. I hope that these comments, coupled with the testimony today of the Secretaries of State and Defense, have addressed your well-articulated concerns on this important issue.

If I may provide you additional information on the Saudi air defense package, or on any other issue of mutual concern, please do not hesitate to call. I would appreciate receiving a copy of the AWACS-related legislation that you intend to introduce on Monday.

Thank you again for your time on September 14.

Sincerely,

Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable S. I. Hayakawa
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

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TAIWAN - Sale of Fighter Aircraft Sept. 25, 1981

Q: What is the status of the sale of fighter aircraft to Taiwan?

A: The status remains the same. We continue to have the question under review. It is our policy to provide defensive weapons to Taiwan, based on our assessment of the military situation in the area. Each weapons request, including aircraft, requires thorough study before a decision can be made.

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FLOOR STATEMENT ON OCTOBER 5, 1981 INTRODUCING RESOLUTION ON THE ARMS SALES PACKAGE TO SAUDI ARABIA

Madam President:

Late last Wednesday night I gave notice to my colleagues that I planned on introducing legislation today relating to the arms sales package to Saudi Arabia.

Since that time I have been extremely concerned about the reports in the press that this issue has our government officials fighting among themselves. And I had the opportunity to read an article in the fall issue of Foreign Affairs by one of our own, Jacob Javits, about the role of Congress in the Taiwan Relations Act. I have also talked with Administration officials and others about what can be done and about my resolution. Madam President, as a consequence I am convinced that the resolution I am about to introduce is a practical alternative that all of us could support.

As I said the other night, I am disturbed at the direction we are taking. It seems to me that this whole matter has come down to a yes or no issue. The result is bound to be victory for one side and humiliation for the other -- the U.S. being the loser in either case.

I have thought long and hard about the historical, cultural and strategic aspects. And it seems to me that there are three basic issues in this whole matter. The State of Israel is the strongest democratic ally the United States has in the Middle East. Most of Israel's neighbors do not even recognize Israel's right to exist. It seems to me that from the Israeli point of view, there cannot

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be peace in the region until they are accepted as a member of the Middle East community.

The Saudis are also our friends and have demonstrated their willingness to work as a partner with the United States not only as an oil supplier, but also in providing economic assistance to other moderate states and in its diplomatic role in negotiating the recent cease-fire in Lebanon. However, the Saudis are a member of the Arab community and as such share their concern about the Palestinian question. And from the Saudi point of view, until this issue is resolved there cannot be peace in the region.

The third basic issue is the national security interests of the United States. Secretary Haig in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on September 17 said, and I agree:

> What is at stake is this nation's capacity to develop a strategy that can move the peace process forward and protect our vital interests in an unstable area exposed not only to historic Arab-Israeli rivalries but increasingly to threats from the Soviet Union and its proxies.

It was my desire that the formal notification of the proposed arms sale would offer alternatives. It did not. It included no safeguard for a change of power in Saudi Arabia. It included no provisions for diplomatic recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia. It gave the Senate no control over the delivery of such equipment in the event of trouble in that area. The Administration has verbally given us these assurances. However, I feel that the advice and consent of the Senate is in this case particularly important.

Before I describe what this resolution does, however, I would like my colleagues to know that it is not as strong as I would have liked. I would like very much to see the Saudis recognize the existence of the State of Israel as a condition for the sale. But I am afraid that this condition might be too much too soon.

My resolution lists three items of a diplomatic nature that indicate the Saudis' recent positive diplomatic activities. The operative part of the resolution is two-fold. First, 60 days before the delivery of the first AWACS or the first of any part of the package the President should send a report to the Senate indicating the current Saudi situation. Second, the Senate is giving notice that it will consider and enact legislation prohibiting delivery of the arms any time it finds the conditions are not being met.

Even though a Senate Resolution does not have the force of law, I believe that with enough support from the Senate we can get a commitment from the President that he will make a report to us--and he can make that commitment because parts of the package will be delivered in 1983. So it is essential we get the support and get this resolution passed before the AWACS vote this month.

Supporting this resolution is not a commitment to vote either way on the sale itself. I, myself, have several concerns such as our arms sale policy but this is one way of meeting one of my major concerns--that is, peace in the Middle East.

I know Madam President that many of us still have concerns of a technical nature and I would not be adverse to addressing these concerns--in fact, I would welcome it--in this resolution provided they are along the lines of the assurances the Saudis have given us.

However, Madam President, as I see it, the best argument that can be made for favoring this sale is that it provides a vehicle for establishing peace in the Middle East. I believe it is time for the Senate to play a role in developing a strategy that can move the peace process forward and I believe my resolution gives us an opportunity to do just that.

97TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 221

Expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to carrying out the proposed sale of certain defense articles and defense services to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 5 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 9), 1981

Mr. HAYAKAWA submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to carrying out the proposed sale of certain defense articles and defense services to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Whereas the State of Israel is the strongest democratic ally of the United States in the Middle East;

Whereas the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a friend and essential partner of the United States; and

Whereas the President has determined that the proposed sale of certain defense articles and defense services to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is in the national security interests of the United States: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That (a) the Senate finds that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—

(1) has conducted an increasingly constructive policy in the Middle East;

(2) has made a major contribution to promoting peace and stability in the Middle East as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia did by playing a significant role in achieving a cease-fire in Lebanon; and

(3) has taken a first step toward participation in a negotiated peaceful solution in the Middle East by indicating that Arab nations could acknowledge the existence of the State of Israel as part of a general settlement.

(b) It is the sense of the Senate that, sixty days before delivering the first of the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft or the first of any other defense article proposed for sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (as described in numbered certifications transmitted to the Congress by the President on September 30, 1981), the President should determine whether or to what extent the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is continuing the practices and policies described in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (a) and should prepare and transmit a report to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate setting forth his determinations.

(c) The Senate hereby expresses its intention to consider and take steps to enact legislation prohibiting the delivery of the defense articles referred to in subsection (b) if the Senate finds that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is no longer carrying out the policies and practices described in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (a).

SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this resolution to the President.

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